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Using a comprehensive set of liquidity measures, this study examines the impact 
of the NYSE Hybrid Market on various stock characteristics. In addition, we test the 
conjecture that trade automation results in more pronounced liquidity improvements for 
small stocks. The resulting change in the relationship between size and liquidity is also 
examined, as well as the change in the explanatory power of the SMB factor. We find 
evidence that the general state of liquidity improved subsequent to migration to Hybrid. 
However, results for the size-conditioned test are mixed and inconsistent across liquidity 
measures. While liquidity improvements in terms of amortized spreads are concentrated 
in small stocks, the pattern is less obvious when other liquidity measures are considered. 
Also, while the test involves a NYSE event, changes also exist in NASDAQ, probably 
due to a competitive spill-over effect. We find that the relationship between size and 
liquidity characteristics has changed post-Hybrid, particularly on NYSE, and that the 
SMB factor has less effect on asset pricing when the entire CRSP sample is tested but not 
for the NYSE and NASDAQ subsamples individually. Nevertheless, firm size seems to 
play an important role in differentiating the impact of changes in market design.     
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 Stock exchanges around the World have undergone remarkable changes in their 
business models, such as automating trading systems and facilitating the trading process 
through new regulations. In academia, one of the earliest calls for trade automation 
appeared in 1971 in a study by Black (Black, 1971) who advocates a fully automated 
market. In automated markets, real investors share the market making responsibility 
without the need for intermediaries who inflate the total cost of trading. Recent years 
have witnessed an intensified pace of developments in stock markets, partly because new 
technology solutions and communication systems enable exchanges to revolutionize the 
way trading takes place in markets. For instance, a number of exchanges have either fully 
or partly transformed from traditional outcry trading floors to automated platforms in the 
last two decades. These changes in technology have been paralleled by other significant 
changes in trading regulations that are aimed at simplifying the trading process. 
Motivated by an increasing need for stock exchanges to keep their competitive 
advantage, owners of these exchanges are now convinced that an efficient and 
competitive market design is essential to attract traders in a dynamic market with an 
abundance of alternative trading venues and low barriers to entry (Jain, 2006).  
 This study examines the effect of technological changes in financial market 
design on different stock characteristics. The study also tests whether the impact of such 
changes has been the same for all stocks regardless of their individual characteristics. 
Examining the effect of technological and regulatory changes on asset pricing, and stock 
and market characteristics preoccupies a significant part of the finance literature. 
Nevertheless, this area of research is still characterized by the lack of consensus, as 
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different schools compete with opposing views on this issue.
1
 One possible reason behind 
this ongoing controversy is that most of these studies assume that changes in market 
design affect all stocks equally. The novelty of this study is that it does not assume that 
technological changes have an across-the-board effect, but rather considers that stocks 
might have been affected differently based on their size, measured by market 
capitalization.  
 This thesis also investigates the relationship between the size and liquidity 
characteristics of stocks by testing the hypothesis that changes in market design decrease 
the level of association between a stock’s size and its state of liquidity. Specifically, we 
conjecture that, if small stocks experience more pronounced improvements in liquidity 
after a change event, then these events might help to redefine the determinants of stock 
liquidity and change the relationship between these two characteristics. This investigation 
directly deals with a concern raised in the literature that there is a need to better 
understand the interaction between the size and liquidity characteristics of individual 
stocks. For example, in his survey paper about the size effect, van Dijk (2011) states that 
the way in which “the size effect and liquidity interact is an important area of future 
research”. Finally, asset pricing implications of such change events are also studied. If 
changes in market design help to disentangle size and liquidity effects, it is important to 
know how these events affect the explanatory power of these two factors in the context of 
a traditional capital asset pricing model.  
                                                 
1
 Examples of studies that support the move to trade automation include: Jain (2006), Stoll (2006) and 
Gutierrez and Tse (2009). In contrast, Venkataraman (2001) and Hendershott and Moulton (2011) 
document various disadvantages associated with trade automation. A more detailed description for these 
two lines of research is presented in the literature review section of this thesis. 
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 This study uses the implementation of the Hybrid system on New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) as the test event. The Hybrid system gives traders the option to 
process trades and match orders automatically for up to one million shares per trade. The 
big magnitude of this event and its relative recentness (end of 2006) make it one of the 
most suitable events for the purpose of this study.
2
 In addition, studying the state of the 
market before and after an event means that the investigation is confined to a single 
market. Some studies (e.g., Venkataraman, 2001) compare characteristics in two different 
markets, although it is very challenging to either identify or account for all the material 
differences across different trading venues.  
 A comprehensive set of liquidity measures are used to examine changes in 
different aspects of liquidity. These liquidity measures are: quoted spreads, effective 
spreads, amortized spreads, Amihud’s price impact measure, and Zeros measure. Results 
for the entire CRSP sample are generally supportive of the hypotheses. However, while 
the test is for a NYSE event, the proposed phenomena are present in not only the NYSE 
sub-sample but also in the NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations) sub-sample, probably due to competitive spill-over effects. In 
addition, the results are not consistent across all liquidity measures. For instance, while 
some liquidity measures show that liquidity has improved on the NYSE and NASDAQ 
subsequent to migration to Hybrid, results for other measures show that liquidity has 
deteriorated. Similarly, firm size appears to be an important factor in explaining liquidity 
changes, but this finding cannot be confirmed across all liquidity measures. There is also 
evidence that the relationship between size and liquidity changed post-Hybrid, and that 
                                                 
2
 This is available at: http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_technology.html. 
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the small-minus-big (SMB) factor has lost part of its explanatory power in an asset 
pricing context. 
 The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some of 
the major changes in financial market design on the NYSE and NASDAQ. Section 3 
provides a review of the related literature. Section 4 outlines data sources and measures. 
Both the general and the size-conditioned tests of the automation impact on liquidity are 
presented in Section 5. The interaction between size and liquidity, and the asset pricing 
implications are examined in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
2. CHANGES IN FINANCIAL MARKET DESIGN 
Trading floors around the world witnessed significant modernizations that have 
reshaped the way trading takes place in these venues. This section briefly reviews recent 
technological and regulatory changes in the two most prominent stock markets in the 
United States; namely, NASDAQ and NYSE. Our focus is the NYSE, since it is the 
primary exchange of interest in this study. NYSE is one of the oldest and most 
established financial markets in the world, and by far the largest stock exchange in terms 
of market capitalization. The most recent annual report of the World Federation of 
Exchanges (WFE) reports that the market capitalization of NYSE-listed stocks totalled 
USD 11.796 trillion at the end of 2011, about triple the market capitalization value of 
USD 3.845 trillion of the World’s second largest market, NASDAQ.3  
Since its launch in 1971, NASDAQ has operated as a purely electronic system, 
although the system was originally used for information dissemination purposes only. 
                                                 
3




NASDAQ was established later as a formal exchange; starting to offer stock listing and a 
full range of trading services.
4
 Unlike NASDAQ, NYSE is known for its open outcry 
trading floor. Since its inception in 1792 when 24 brokers met under a buttonwood tree, 
the NYSE has depended on a face-to-face mechanism for trading.
5
 Nevertheless, NYSE 
has experienced a fast pace of development and implementation of the latest technologies 
despite maintaining the central role of its specialists in trade intermediation. For instance, 
NYSE is connected to European markets since 1866 through a trans-Atlantic cable that 
provides near instant communication. Starting in 1878, telephones were installed in the 
trading floors to communicate trading orders. Dealers at NYSE adopted a fully-
centralized clearing system since 1920 (Jain and Johnson, 2006).  
This trend towards automation on the NYSE has further intensified in recent 
decades. In 1976, the automated Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) system was 
launched to electronically route smaller orders to specialist posts where orders get 
executed at the end of the trading process. This system later was upgraded to what is 
known as the Super Dot, enabling more orders to be routed electronically. Traditionally, 
orders were routed to the market where traded stocks were listed. In 1978, NYSE was 
connected to other competing exchanges in the U.S., enabling dealers to access quotes 
offered in other markets for cross-listed stocks and to route their orders to any market that 
offers the best quote. During the 1990s, the market witnessed major expansions in 
network bandwidth to handle larger trading capacity, and also to accommodate modern 
sophisticated systems and the then-newly-introduced communication devices (Jain and 
Johnson, 2006).  
                                                 
4
 This is available at: http://www.nasdaqomx.com/whoweare/quickfacts/#. 
5
 This is available at: http://corporate.nyx.com/en/who-we-are/history/new-york. 
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Despite introducing such advanced technological solutions, NYSE has preserved 
the full discretion that specialists have over trading,
6
 and therefore cannot be considered 
as being a fully-automated market. While most of the trading process takes place 
electronically, trade execution is still dependent on human intervention. Trading is 
considered automated only when the actual matching of orders happens automatically 
through the trading systems. The turning point in NYSE happened in 2000, when it 
introduced its Direct+ system which could immediately execute limit orders of up to 
1,099 shares. This feature was further augmented by the launch of the Hybrid Market 
system in 2006, which is capable of automatically executing orders of up to one million 
shares. The implementation of Hybrid was facilitated by the merger of NYSE with the 
giant electronic communication network (ECN) Archipelago earlier in 2006.
7
 
There are a number of possible reasons why the NYSE is enriching its automatic 
execution options to market participants. Fast order execution by ECNs, along with 
competition from regional exchanges such as Boston, Chicago, and Cincinnati, pressured 
NYSE to adapt to new technologies (Freund and Pagano, 2000; Stoll, 2006). ECNs have 
changed the trading process dramatically as they have the ability to mediate trades 
between two natural investors whose orders can be paired off at minimal or zero spreads 
against a flat fee. This is in contrast to dealers who have an incentive to interfere with 
order matching and to engage themselves on one side of each trade. This may generate 
extra fees and unnecessarily widen spreads, which can adversely affect prices and 
execution speed.   
                                                 
6
 NYSE assigns only one specialist to each stock to handle all market-making activities for that stock. On 
the other hand, NASDAQ requires at least two dealers to make the market for each stock, with the number 
of dealers per stock ranging from 2 to 50 (Christie and Schultz, 1994). 
7
 This is available at: http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_events.html. 
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The anticipation for increased trading volume has also highlighted the importance 
of automated trading systems which can handle such operations more efficiently. Another 
important proposed reason behind the shift to the automated platform is that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has introduced the  “Order Protection Rule” 
that protects better quotes in different markets only if these quotes are immediately 
accessible, something that can be guaranteed almost only by automated real-time systems 
(Hendershott and Moulton, 2011). Therefore, markets started to migrate increasingly to 
real-time systems to ensure that their quotes are accessible for all traders in other 
markets.   
This revolutionary change in NYSE has possibly supported the position of traders 
by offering multiple trading venues and options, and simultaneously has limited the 
powers of specialists. In the presence of an automated system, orders going through 
specialists need not be executed necessarily at the specialist’s discretion. The decreased 
monopoly power of specialists and floor brokers who trade on behalf of institutional 
investors is reflected in seat prices that have generally decreased in recent years (Stoll, 
2006). Seat ownership represents the right to trade on the market floor. Therefore, falling 
prices of seats demonstrate the diminishing value of traditional trading methods.     
These technological advancements have coincided with other changes in trading 
regulations and other aspects of market design, which may have further reduced trading 
costs and enhanced the agility and flexibility of the trading process. Three examples of 
such changes are discussed next. In 1997, NYSE reduced its minimum tick size to 
sixteenth instead of eighths, to eventually become one penny in 2000, an event that is 
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commonly referred to as decimalization.
8
 The removal of such artificial spread 
boundaries allows spreads to better adhere to fundamental spread determinants. 
Therefore, spreads may experience a decline after decimalization if larger tick sizes 
previously forced them to be unnecessarily wide. A number of studies (e.g., 
Bessembinder, 2003) find that spreads have significantly declined, and that investors 
have a higher probability of obtaining price improvements after decimalization.  
The second example of regulatory change is the constant reduction of the minimum 
order size by the SEC. For instance, the minimum order entry size of a Mid-Point Passive 
Liquidity Order “MPL Order”9 was reduced from 1000 to 100 shares in 2007, and further 
to one share in 2011.
10
 Lowering minimum order size enables investors to trade a small 
number of shares with exchanges directly without the need to involve intermediaries who 
profit from unbundling large orders to small individual investors, which results in 
additional costs for small trades. The reduction might also increase trading volumes, 
since odd-lot traders (small traders who trade less than 100 stocks) are no longer inhibited 
from frequently adjusting their holdings as desired.   
Finally, while the number of individual specialists is relatively stable over time, the 
number of specialist firms to which specialists belong has shrunk from 67 in 1975 (Stoll, 
2006) to only seven in 2011.
11
 The clustering of specialist firms reflects the economies of 
scale inherent in this business, which may translate into reduced trading costs. This may 
explain the emergence of discount and deep discount brokerage services that offer 
                                                 
8
 This is available at: http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_trading.html. 
9
 NYSE defines an MPL order as “an undisplayed limit order that is priced at the midpoint of the Protected 
Best Bid and Offer (PBBO)”. MPL orders can generally match with any other order regardless of its type. 
This is available at: http://usequities.nyx.com/markets/nyse-arca-equities/order-types.   
10
 This is available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2011/34-64523.pdf. 
11
 This is available at: http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/specialistmagarticle.pdf. 
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standard trading services at a lower commission fee than that charged by regular 
brokerage firms.  
In contrast to the NYSE, where specialists enjoy monopoly power in handling the 
order flow of their designated stocks, NASDAQ requires at least two dealers for each 
stock to handle its trade orders. This market structure is designed to foster competition 
among dealers, with the hope that this will result in reduced spreads and better services 
for traders. However, several academic studies (e.g., Christie and Schultz, 1994) show 
that spreads largely depart from the minimum tick size (one-eighth at that time), and that 
the inside spread for a large number of stocks is at least $0.25. These studies have 
uncovered lack of competition among dealers. It seems that NASDAQ dealers were 
coordinating to keep spreads artificially wide in order to maximize their profits at the 
expense of investors. This finding led NASDAQ administration to immediately take strict 
measures to force tighter spreads by urging dealers to stop avoiding odd-eights spreads. 
On May 24, 1994, NASDAQ officials met with dealers to communicate the new 
measures. Shortly afterwards, spreads dropped dramatically on the exchange (Christie et 
al., 1994).  
This competition increasing action by NASDAQ was further augmented by a series of 
rules in 1997 that are aimed at increasing inter-dealer competition (Chung and Van Ness, 
2001). The order handling rules (OHR), which were phased-in gradually for all 
NASDAQ stocks during the period from January 20, 1997 to October 13, 1997, intend to 
make the inter-dealer market more transparent and expose dealers to more competition. 
The OHR stipulates that market makers should disclose and make accessible limit orders 
offered by customers, so that any transaction should guarantee the best price available in 
10 
 
the limit order book. Even in the case of “preferencing”, the arrangement should satisfy 
execution at the optimal price. The rule has also banned market makers from directly 
offering quotes to other dealers or special customers, as any offered quote should first be 
posted in an ECN, which makes quotes accessible to the public. These essential changes 
in NASDAQ are an example of important regulatory changes that fostered competition, 
and possibly increased liquidity.  
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section presents findings from several studies about the impact of trade 
automation and other changes in financial market design on liquidity and other aspects of 
market quality. Although several studies investigate this effect, the evidence on this issue 
seems to be inconclusive. Two schools of thought can clearly be identified in the 
literature. One school documents a positive impact of automation on market quality, 
while the other school finds a negative net benefit from increased automation due to the 
deterioration in quality and increase in trading costs that have coincided with increased 
automation.      
Domowitz and Steil (1999) construct a benchmark measure of trading costs that 
accounts for differences in trading characteristics across different U.S. markets. They find 
that costs are generally lower for trades executed by electronic systems than for those 
processed through traditional brokers. They also investigate the effect of automation on 
market structure and find that a number of market quality features have improved in the 
post-automation era, such as efficiency and contestability. For instance, cross-
subsidization of trades, which is a practice of charging a higher price to a subset of 
11 
 
investors in order to compensate for discounts offered to another subset of investors, is 
not as evident in an electronic versus traditional market. The rationale offered is that 
sustainability of prices in contestable markets impedes exchanges from offering 
discounted services to institutional investors (large trades) at the expense of retail 
investors (small trades), resulting in a more efficient pricing for market participants. 
Stoll (2006) identifies three major benefits for electronic trading; namely, 
improved efficiency, increased liquidity, and accuracy of price signals. Although 
automated systems limit the powers and per trade profits of brokers and market makers, 
these systems still have the potential to indirectly benefit these intermediaries, because 
advanced markets attract more firm listings on the supply side and trading volume on the 
demand side. This increased activity more than offsets the decline in the “per unit” cost 
of trading. This is evident in the increase of total commissions paid by investors which 
increased from $4 billion in 1980 to $25 billion in 2011 (Li et al., 2007).
12
  
Based on an event study using the implementation of Hybrid in NYSE, Gutierrez 
and Tse (2009) find a significant decrease in inventory control cost for specialists, and 
changes in effective spreads that range from statistically insignificant differences for 
trades of certain sizes to a significant average drop of $0.028 for large market orders.  
Several studies observe similar effects from trade automation in an international 
context. For 43 countries including the U.S., Domowitz (2002) finds that electronic 
trading is associated with lower transaction costs. Frino et al. (1998) compare intra-day 
trading data for the Bund future contracts on both the automated Deutsche Terminborse 
                                                 
12
 This is available at: http://www.nyse.com/press/1330947043600.html. 
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(DTB) and the then-open-outcry London International Financial Futures Exchange 
(LIFFE), reporting that spreads are significantly tighter on the DTB. Frino et al. also 
conclude that automated exchanges provide more liquidity than floor-based exchanges, 
although the performance of automated exchanges deteriorates as volatility increases. 
Naidu and Rozeff (1994) and Sioud and Hmaied (2003) document a substantial increase 
in liquidity post-automation for the Singapore and Tunisian Stock Exchanges, 
respectively. 
Jain (2006) finds that 75% of the switches from floor to automated market 
structures based on a study of 120 exchanges are associated with an improvement in 
liquidity and that this improvement is more pronounced in emerging than developed 
markets. The switch to automation reduces the cost of equity for listed firms by up to 
0.49% per month. Jain argues that automation increases the popularity of stocks as 
investment vehicles, and that this increased demand reduces returns. Jain also argues that 
automated trading reduces the cost of equity due to reduced information asymmetry 
caused by the increased informativeness that automation conveys to stock markets.   
The proliferation of alternative trading venues may also demonstrate the merits of 
automated trading. Recent years witnessed a significant rise for ECNs, through which 
trades are directly crossed among investors against a flat fee, avoiding the need for 
intermediaries (Conrad et al., 2003). In addition to savings in commissions paid to 
intermediaries, investors enjoy smaller spreads through ECNs and better quote quality 
(Huang, 2002). The merger of both NYSE and NASDAQ with major ECNs (with 
Archipelago and Instinet, respectively) shows the increasing popularity of electronic 
trading in these two major U.S. markets (Stoll, 2006).  
13 
 
A series of studies dealing with the limitations of technology find that trading 
through electronic systems is more prone to interruptions because of possible technical 
glitches. Several stock market incidents are linked to technical problems. The “flash 
crash” on May 6, 2010, in which U.S. markets witnessed the biggest one-day decline, 
was attributed to programmed traders that blindly followed certain algorithms (Easley et 
al., 2011). The tepid debut of Facebook’s public trading on NASDAQ, which took place 
on May 18, 2012, is also attributed to a technical glitch that delayed trading to 11:30 am. 
Delayed trading and accumulation of pending orders allegedly increased uncertainty 
among investors and contributed to the plunge in share price to less than $35 from its 
initial price of $38 within the first hours of trading.
13
 
Some studies report higher trading costs in automated versus floor-based trade 
venues. Venkataraman (2001) finds that trading costs on the automated Paris Bourse are 
higher than those on the traditional NYSE, especially in terms of effective spreads. 
Venkataraman concludes that the presence of a human interface is essential to enhance 
liquidity. However, findings from studies where trades are compared across different 
markets are only indicative, since it is challenging to account for all differences in 
regulations, insider trading laws, and firm characteristics across different trading venues 
(Jain, 2006). 
Hendershott and Moulton (2011) study the effect of introducing Hybrid to the 
NYSE where they match NYSE and NASDAQ stocks that have similar characteristics to 
calculate the differences in spreads for each pair of stocks. The rationale for this 
methodological approach is to account for market-wide differences, so that such general 
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 This is available at: http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/20/technology/nasdaq-facebook-ipo/index.htm. 
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changes are not mistakenly taken to be the result of Hybrid. The authors find that spreads 
have widened on NYSE post-Hybrid due to compensation for increased adverse 
selection. They speculate that investors interacting through electronic systems have less 
trust due to the anonymous nature of trades. A possible problem with their approach is 
that the matching procedure that is intended to exclude seemingly market-wide unrelated 
changes might unwittingly exclude genuine Hybrid effects, since inter-market 
competition could spill-over Hybrid effects from NYSE to other markets, such as 
NASDAQ.       
4. DATA AND MEASURES 
To determine the impact of trade automation, we analyze the changes in stock 
characteristics around a major NYSE event. Some previous studies identify the effects of 
automation trends by tracking market expenditures on Information Technology (IT) (e.g., 
Freund and Pagano, 2000), but this approach may not result in an accurate identification 
of automation milestones. One reason why IT expenditures may not be a good measure of 
automation effects is that numerous changes in financial markets which possibly 
contributed to improved liquidity and build economies of scale in the trading industry 
may not be captured by IT investments. Nevertheless, there exist few well identified 
automation events that can be effectively examined. The reason is that some events have 
taken place gradually over a long period of time such as the consolidation of specialist 
firms or the events did not have a market-wide impact, such as regulations affecting only 
certain types of stocks or transactions.  
15 
 
One of the most important changes on NYSE is the adoption of direct exchange 
systems, such as Direct+ and Hybrid Market. Each of these two events affected all 
NYSE-listed stocks. However, the larger magnitude of Hybrid, which can handle orders 
of up to one million shares, makes this event more likely to affect system-wide market 
operations and is therefore a better candidate for study. NYSE rolled out the Hybrid 
system gradually between October 6, 2006 and January 24, 2007 (Hendershott and 
Moulton, 2011). The Hybrid four-month roll-out period is relatively short compared to 
automation events in other markets such as the implementation of the Computer-Assisted 
Trading System (CATS) on Toronto Stock Exchange that started in 1977 and continued 
for two decades before including all stocks.
14
 The quick implementation of Hybrid 
reduces the probability that other exogenous factors contribute to any observed change 
during this period. Shortly after Hybrid came into effect, NYSE lost more than 60% of 
the trades from its floor to automated exchanges (Gutierrez and Tse, 2009).  
To conduct our analysis our main dataset is obtained from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP). The following daily data items are obtained for all stocks for the 
period from October 2003 to January 2010: closing price, maximum price, minimum price, 
trading volume, number of shares outstanding, closing bid and ask, and return. Daily Fama 
and French small-minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML), and Momentum (UMD) 
factors are also downloaded through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) for the 
studied period. Market volatility is proxied by the Volatility Index (VIX), whose daily 
closing values are obtained from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Website.  
                                                 
14
 This is available at: http://www.economywatch.com/stockexchanges/canadian.html. 
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 Stock-day observations are deleted if the number of shares outstanding is 
unavailable, less than, or equal to zero; trading volume is unavailable or less than zero; 
minimum price is greater than maximum price; bid is greater than ask; minimum price, 
maximum price, bid, or ask are unavailable; price is less than $5; and quoted or effective 
spreads are greater than 30% of price. The latter rule is a common exclusion in the 
literature [e.g. Chalmers and Kadlec, 1998 (20%) and Zhang, 2010 (30%)] as these 
observations are extreme outliers. The elimination of “penny stock” observations is also a 
common practice, in order to ensure that results are not affected by very small stocks or 
bid-ask bounce of illiquid stocks (Fang and Peress, 2009). We also conducted the 
analysis with penny-stocks and wide-spread stocks included, but as there are no 
qualitative differences with the results presented herein they have been omitted in the 
interest of brevity. 
 Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural log of market capitalization value for 
each stock i at day t as:                                                      , 
where PRC is the closing price of a stock. We exclude observations with SIZE values of 
less than $10 million and larger than $100 billion. This rule resulted in excluding less 
than 1% of stock-day observations. Stocks are classified each day into deciles based on 
their SIZE values, where deciles 1 and 10 contain the smallest and largest stocks, 
respectively.       
 Liquidity is multidimensional in that it reflects trading quantity, trading speed, 
trading cost, and price impact (Liu, 2006). Since standard liquidity measures usually 
cover only one or two of these four dimensions, the choice of measure(s) depends on 
what is being studied. While depth (quantity of shares that are available for trade at a 
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certain price), volume, and turnover measure liquidity from a trading quantity 
perspective, bid-ask spread (as the cost of immediate transactions) is frequently used 
when the cost side of liquidity is the focus of the investigation. Furthermore, measures 
based on microstructure data are generally more accurate than measures constructed from 
daily or monthly data. However, researchers frequently face a trade-off between the 
simplicity of a measure and the added benefits of using a more accurate one (Amihud, 
2002). This tradeoff becomes particularly important when a study involves a long time 
horizon or if data are not readily available.   
A comprehensive set of liquidity measures are used. Bid-ask spreads are one of 
the relevant liquidity measures for the purpose of this study. The hypothesized role of 
technology in reducing inventory control risk and order clearance costs is expected to be 
reflected in spreads if monopoly rents and the asymmetric component of the spread 
remain unchanged. Quoted, effective, and amortized spreads are used. Quoted Spread for 
stock i at day t (QSPDi,t) is equal to (             )       ⁄ , where        and       are 
closing ask and bid quotes, respectively, for stock i at day t, and the stock midpoint 
(      ) is (             )  ⁄ .  
Effective spreads are also considered since they represent the actual cost incurred 
by traders. Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) mention that effective spreads are almost 50-
70% of quoted spreads, and that the average correlation between them is 31%. Effective 
spreads are estimated using both the Gibbs estimator (EGIB) of Hasbrouck (2009)15 and 
Corwin and Schultz (2011) approach (ECOR). These two estimation methods are argued 
                                                 
15
 Hasbrouck’s approach is a Bayesian estimation of the Roll model (Roll, 1984) and produces estimations 
on annual frequency. The author argues that using monthly or weekly frequency results in unreliable 
estimations. I thank Joel Hasbrouck for offering the estimations for all CRSP stocks on his website.  
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to be very accurate and outperform other approaches. Corwin and Schultz method uses 
high-low price ratios, assuming that high (low) prices usually correspond to buy (sell) 
orders. The ratio represents both the bid-ask spread as well as the volatility of a stock. 
The volatility component of the ratio is proportionate to the interval of the ratio, while the 
bid-ask spread is constant regardless of the interval. Using these assumptions allows the 
authors to estimate effective spreads from ratios of one- and two-day intervals. 
Specifically, the estimation method proceeds as follows: 
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   ; 
MAX (MIN) is the maximum (minimum) price;  
and t and t+1 refer to the day index.  
While effective spreads are found for specific transactions with investors having 
different horizons, amortized spreads incorporate the stock holding period to represent 
the cost for a typical investor. Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) show that a stock’s amortized 
spread is approximately equal to its effective spread multiplied by annual turnover. Price 
impact measure (Amihud) is considered (Amihud, 2002), where           equals to 
                 
|         |
. The original price impact measure is inversed to represent liquidity 
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rather than illiquidity. Lesmond et al. (1999) construct a simple liquidity measure (Zeros) 
that is also used in this study. The measure is obtained by dividing the number of zero-
return days in a month by the number of trading days in that month. This measure is 
designed to estimate transaction costs, based on an assumption that investors are deterred 
from trading when transaction costs are higher than expected return resulting in zero 
return for that day.      
 A number of daily firm-level and market-level controls are used in testing the 
impact of the event on liquidity. Firm-level controls include SIZE; turnover (TO), which 
is the daily number of shares traded, divided by the number of shares outstanding; and 
PRC. In their test for the Hybrid effect, Hendershott and Moulton (2011) include daily 
differences for a number of stock-level data items. The inclusion of these differences 
accounts for any effect that daily shocks might have on the liquidity level for stocks. In 
this study, daily differences for price (PRCDIF) and turnover (TODIF) are considered for 
each stock i at day t. Specifically:  
           
                
      
 
          
              
     
 
 Market-level controls include RETYesterday, RETToday, and RETTomorrow, 
which refer to daily equally-weighted averages of market returns at days t-1, t, and t+1, 
respectively. Brockman et al. (2009) include these three terms in examining changes in 
liquidity. Finally, market volatility is included in the test specification as a control for 
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market general activity. Volatility is proxied by the closing value of the Volatility Index 
for the market for each day t (VIX).  
For the purpose of the asset pricing test, we include market excess return (MKT), 
small-minus-big (SMB), high-minus-low (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors, which 
are all available on a daily frequency. However, no liquidity factor, such as that of Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003) or Sadka (2006), is available on a daily basis. Therefore, simple 
daily liquidity factor (LIQFAC) and level liquidity measure (LIQLEV) are constructed. 
The daily LIQFAC is constructed in the following manner. First, stocks are sorted into 
deciles daily based on their QSPD values. For each decile, the equally-weighted average 
market return is calculated for each day. The difference between the averages of deciles 
10 and 1 is found, and considered to be the liquidity factor for that day. On the other 
hand, LIQLEV, which is calculated daily for each stock based on one of the liquidity 
measures at a time, equals the liquidity measure value minus the daily market average of 
that measure. This construction method is similar to that used by He and Kryzanowski 
(2006).  
  Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis are presented next. Proportions of 
stocks with declining QSPD/ECOR in each SIZE decile are plotted in Figures 1.A and 1.B 
for NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples, respectively. Figure 1.A shows that at least 80% 
of the stocks in each of the smallest five deciles enjoyed tighter quoted spreads post-
Hybrid. The figure is decreasing monotonically in SIZE after that. The trend is not as 
obvious with ECOR. Results for NASDAQ stocks in Figure 1.B shows that the number of 
stocks with declining QSPD is less than that on NYSE, but numbers are also smaller for 
larger deciles. The first four columns of Table 1 present average proportional QSPD and 
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ECOR. Figures show that, by and large, spreads are tighter on NYSE than NASDAQ, 
especially for small stocks. Large stocks however, enjoy tighter spreads on NASDAQ. 
The last four columns of the table present mean and median changes in QSPD and ECOR. 
Average QSPD, ECOR, and SIZE decile have been found for each stock before and after 
Hybrid. Averages from the two periods have been matched for each decile. Then changes 
are calculated based on the difference in spreads in the year following Hybrid 
implementation from the year preceding that. Results from QSPD and ECOR are different. 
Results that are based on QSPD show that the amount of reduction is almost 
monotonically decreasing in SIZE deciles, with mean (median) changes for NYSE stocks 
of -24.58% (-23.84%) and 56.1% (44.87%) in deciles 1 and 10, respectively.     
In addition to that, stocks have been sorted into QSPD-based deciles on a daily 
basis, where decile 1 (10) corresponds to the smallest (widest) spread stocks which have 
the highest (lowest) level of liquidity. The percentage of smallest 30% stocks out of all 
stocks in each QSPD decile has been calculated, for the year preceding the Hybrid and the 
year subsequent to it, separately. The analysis has been made for the CRSP sample as 
well as NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples. Results, which are presented in Table 2, show 
that the percentage of small stocks that have high levels of liquidity has increased while 
the percentage of small stocks that have low levels of liquidity has decreased post-
Hybrid. This pattern is more apparent in NYSE than in NASDAQ sub-sample. This result 
gives an indication that the association between size and liquidity of stocks might have 
decreased in recent years.    
22 
 
5. HYBRID’S IMPACT ON LIQUIDITY: HYPOTHESES AND 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
5.1 Unconditional Test   
As reviewed above, stock trading venues have undergone continual major 
innovations in technology and regulations. This continuous modernization process, which 
coincided with an ongoing trend for consolidation in the financial services industry, 
helped to centralize and facilitate the process of trading and supply of liquidity (Lhabitant 
et al., 2008). On balance, the evidence on the effect of trade automation on liquidity and 
other market quality aspects supports positive benefits from trade automation. However, 
it is important to formally test the following hypothesis about the general impact of 
automation on liquidity before moving to subsequent tests.  
  
                                                                      
  
                                                       
In order to test this hypothesis, we regress liquidity measures on a dummy 
variable (Event) and a set of control variables. Specifically:  
                                                                           
                                                                                
                  ∑   
 
                                           
where LIQi,t refers to one of the seven liquidity measures presented above of stock i on 
day t; Eventt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if day t is after (before) the 
implementation of Hybrid. In addition to Event and control variables, we include 
Dummy Interaction variables which are the interaction of Event with each of the 
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controls in order to capture changes in the explanatory power of these controls 
subsequent to migration to Hybrid. The test is conducted using observations for two years 
centered on the event that do not include observations during the event’s roll-out period. 
In October 2006, NYSE started to move stocks to Hybrid. By the end of January 2007, all 
NYSE stocks had migrated to the new system. Therefore, observations corresponding to 
this period are excluded. Observations used are for the year preceding the Hybrid 
(October 2005 to September 2006) and the year subsequent to its implementation 
(February 2007 to January 2008). The choice of the two years centered on the roll-out 
period is made partly to avoid the effects that the credit crisis had on equity markets when 
testing the Hybrid, as the crisis weighed heavily on stock markets during 2008. 
Qualitatively similar results are obtained when the window is increased to four years. The 
fixed-effects regressions employ a generalized least squares method where standard 
errors are adjusted for time- and firm-level clustering as suggested by Peterson (2009). 
This is based on the Hausman test results which suggest that a fixed effects model 
produces more efficient estimates than a random effects approach. The Hausman test is 
conducted for all the variations of Equation 1 and Equation 2 (section 7) with similar 
results for both models. Equation 1 is estimated for three groups of stocks: CRSP sample, 
NYSE, and NASDAQ sub-samples. If βs take negative values, then it means that 
liquidity has improved post-event, hence   
  can be rejected.   
 Table 3 presents results for estimation of Equation 1. For the CRSP sample results 
which are presented in Panel A of the table, coefficients of Event dummy (β) have 
statistically-significant values with conforming sign for all liquidity measures except for 
AGIB, Amihud, and Zeros. Among spread measures, direct reduction in spreads ranges 
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from 0.18 to 0.8 basis points (BPS) in EGIB and QSPD, respectively. Examining results 
for NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples separately, however, uncovers that the reduction is 
not confined to NYSE (the event venue) only when some liquidity measures are used. 
While QSPD and Zeros shrank for NYSE stocks only, ECOR reduction at NASDAQ is 
double the reduction at NYSE. NASDAQ stocks also experienced a sizeable reduction of 
almost 5 BPS in ACOR.16  
An alternative testing approach for event studies such as these is to ignore the 
period immediately following events. This test design is based on the argument that 
changes might require long periods of time to show effect. Jain (2006) examines the 
switch from floor trading to electronic trading in 120 countries, he allows a transition 
period of one year subsequent to changes “for popularity of electronic exchanges”. 
Edwards et al. (2007) study the effect of the implementation of the Trade Reporting and 
Compliance Engine (TRACE) system in the bond market in the U.S.. They also exclude 
observations during the six months following the implementation of the system in order 
“to allow market participants time to familiarize themselves with the system”. Therefore, 
Equation 1 is re-estimated using a two-year window as well, but allowing a transitory 
period following the roll-out period. Observations during this transitory period are 
excluded from the test and replaced by observations of the year following it. Different 
transitory periods are used: three months, six months, and one year. Results are 
untabulated to conserve space, but they are generally in the same direction as those 
                                                 
16 NYSE-NASDAQ dual listing has been allowed in 2004. For robustness, I exclude observations 
pertaining to dual-listed firms and retest Hypotheses 1 and 2. Results are unaffected by this elimination. 
Exclusion includes observations of all dual-listed stocks as of November 2006. These stocks are: Apache 
Corporation, Walgreen Co., American Financial Group, Inc., Chicago Mercantile Exchange Holdings, 
Ivanhoe Mines Ltd., Harmony Gold Mining Co. Ltd., Nuveen Equity Premium Advantage Fund, Nuveen 
Equity Premium Income Fund, Nuveen Equity Premium Opportunity Fund, Calamos Strategic Total Return 
Fund, and First Trust/Aberdeen Emerging Opportunity Fund (Hedge et al. 2010). 
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presented in Table 3 in that improvement in liquidity is not consistent across liquidity 
measures and that improvement is witnessed for both NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples.  
5.2 Size-conditioned Test 
This section investigates whether the obscure evidence from the unconditional test 
is due to the aggregate nature of the test. Stratifying the sample into SIZE deciles might 
reveal a pattern in liquidity changes. Table 3 shows that some of the SIZE interaction 
terms are associated with significant coefficients especially for NYSE sub-sample, which 
alludes to the possibility that firm size played a role in explaining the cross-sectional 
differences of the Hybrid impact.  
The basis for this conjecture is made by an analogy with findings in 
administrative sciences demonstrating that technology through standardization plays an 
important role in enabling economies of scale in industries (e.g., Douglas and Wind, 
1987). Financial markets in competitive economies, such as that of the U.S. and other 
developed countries, offer transaction services and financial products to traders, who can 
be considered as consumers (Domowitz and Stein, 1999). Advanced technological 
solutions are transforming the business model of a traditional stock exchange that offers a 
bundle of services for each trade. Competition from ECNs and online service providers 
are forcing exchanges to eliminate their non-essential services and maintain their core 
business units only (i.e., trade execution, quote and price server, and stock hosting). The 
exchanges are finding it more efficient to outsource supporting services to specialized 
firms that can offer such services at lower cost. As a result, modern exchanges resemble 
utility firms that can operate very efficiently at a low profit margin. Thus, exchanges that 
adopt modern technologies are able to handle larger trading capacity more efficiently 
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than their less technologically-advanced counterparts. The relatively fixed cost of 
automated trading platforms makes the direct variable cost “per unit” of trading 
negligible, as long as automated systems have enough capacity to execute additional 
trades.  
Reductions in trading costs are expected to be reflected in both explicit and 
implicit trading costs (Stoll, 2006). Explicit costs include brokerage fees, commissions, 
and trading loss due to the effective bid-ask spread. The automation of trading platforms 
along with the disintermediation process due to the reduction in the number of 
intermediaries through which a trade order passes results in less fees and commissions 
borne by traders. Electronic trading systems do not require traders to report physically to 
trading floors. In an electronic market, traders can remotely trade and contribute to the 
supply of liquidity in a more effective manner than in a traditional floor-trading system. 
Automated systems also allow foreign investors to enter markets, causing even more 
competition among suppliers of liquidity. In addition, the automatic execution of orders 
eases the monopoly of dealers, reduces clearing cost (particularly in the presence of a 
consolidated national book of orders), offers higher opportunities to clear outstanding 
orders, which relieves dealers from part of the inventory risk. All of these are important 
components of the bid-ask spread (Glosten and Harris, 1988). Implicit costs include the 
cost of delay between order entry and order execution, which is largely alleviated by 
automated trading.   
A number of studies in the marketing and management information systems fields 
(e.g., Hsieh and Lin, 1998) find that electronic commerce and automated business 
applications offer a competitive advantage to small businesses in particular by removing 
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barriers faced by small firms that cannot effectively compete against “big fishes” in a 
traditional brick-and-mortar market. In a separate field, economists have formulated what 
is known as the “catch-up” or “convergence” effect (Abramovitz, 1986). Researchers 
observe a tendency for less developed economies to grow at a faster rate than more 
developed economies as they “catch-up”. Economists argue that small economies start to 
enjoy advanced technologies and start to share the use of common platforms and 
resources at some point in time.  
This hypothesis incorporates the conjecture that recent changes in financial 
market design offer different relative benefits to stocks differentiated by their size. 
Specifically, the conjecture is that the liquidity of small stocks has benefited most from 
trade automation systems.  
  
                                                                            
                          
  
                                                                       
                               
To test this hypothesis, Equation 1 is estimated for each SIZE decile individually 
rather than for the entire groups of stocks. Coefficients across deciles are compared and 
statistically-tested for differences among them. This involves testing pairs of coefficients 
for differences between their values. Computed statistics are based on the asymptotic chi-
square distribution of the likelihood ratio statistic. Table 4 contains results for estimating 
Equation 1 for each SIZE decile individually, for CRSP sample (Panel A), NYSE (Panel 
B) and NASDAQ (Panel C) sub-samples. For brevity, we present results for the 
28 
 
coefficient estimates of Event, SIZE, and SIZE Interaction only. Results for the CRSP 
sample shows that statistically-significant improvements in liquidity are concentrated in 
smaller stocks, with some exceptions. For instance, ECOR (ACOR) has reduced for decile 
2 (1) only. The reduction in QSPD is probably most aligned with our hypothesis, as 
reduction is almost monotonically decreasing in deciles. Spreads measured by AGIB have 
actually widened for stocks in deciles 4, 6, 7, and 10. In terms of Amihud, however, there 
is evidence that smaller stocks (deciles 1, 3, 4, and 6) have experienced more 
deterioration in liquidity. In addition, EGIB seems to be reduced for decile 9 only. 
Results presented in Panel B of Table 4 show that unlike the rest of the stocks, 
small NYSE stocks (decile 1) have experienced a decline in terms of the two amortized 
spreads measures; ACOR and AGIB. The coefficients of effective spreads measures show 
that large stocks (decile 9) only have experienced the decline which is contradictory to 
our hypothesis. In addition, results for Amihud show that the liquidity of smallest 20% of 
stocks has deteriorated. Improvement in terms of QSPD and Zeros is limited to middle 
size stocks (deciles 3, 5, 6, and 7). Panel C shows a different pattern for NASDAQ 
stocks. Small (large) stocks experienced liquidity improvement in terms of ACOR and 
Zeros (effective spreads).  
According to the previous results,   
  can be rejected for the NYSE sub-sample 
when liquidity is measured by amortized spreads only. The overall evidence underscores 
the important role that SIZE seems to play in differentiating the Hybrid’s impact on 
liquidity, which can be witnessed from statistical differences among βs across deciles in 
Table 4 and significant values associated with SIZE Interaction terms in Table 3. 
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However, the evidence does not seem to be specifically in favor of our hypothesis 
regarding the distribution of the relationship across SIZE deciles. Also, despite 
controlling for many possible factors, it is still unclear whether the differences across 
deciles can be attributed to size per se or to other correlated factors. Nevertheless, we can 
conclude that Hybrid did not impact all stocks in the same fashion, and this fact might be 
behind the controversy of the literature examining the impact of automation on market 
quality.  
6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIZE AND LIQUIDITY: 
HYPOTHESIS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Small stocks have realized a higher average return than larger stocks, even after 
adjusting returns for risk. However, it is unknown “whether market value per se matters 
or whether it is only a proxy for unknown true additional factors correlated with market 
value” (Banz, 1981). Various theories are proposed to explain the so-called “small size 
puzzle”. One such explanation involves greater liquidity and transaction costs. This line 
of research finds that the abnormality in small stock returns can be explained at least 
partially by larger transaction costs due to the relatively illiquid nature of such stocks. In 
other words, liquidity which is highly correlated with firm size is a partial explanation for 
the puzzle.  
Stoll and Whaley (1983) investigate the small size issue and find that the 
abnormal return observed for small stocks merely represents the difference of trading 
costs between small and large stocks. Stoll and Whaley consider returns from the investor 
perspective net of transaction costs. Assuming that investors incur a round trip cost each 
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quarter, they find that the size effect has disappeared. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
incorporate the holding period and clientele effect in addition to trading costs and 
conclude that firm size is a proxy for liquidity. In more recent evidence, Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) find that portfolios of small size have the highest loadings on the 
liquidity factor based on their liquidity-augmented pricing model. This reasoning implies 
that the interaction between size and liquidity effects has obscured the way through 
which each of these two factors affect returns.  
If the former argument that the size effect partly represents a liquidity premium, 
then any liquidity-affecting mechanism is expected to have some bearing on the size 
effect. Observing a reduction in the size effect after an important automation event would 
lend credence to the liquidity and transaction costs explanations for the size effect in 
returns. In fact, a number of studies (e.g., Chan et al., 2000; Dimson and Marsh, 1999) 
empirically document a reduction in the size effect in the recent period. Another channel 
by which technology may reduce the size effect is in the context of market 
informativeness about stocks. Merton (1987) finds that less well-known (usually small) 
stocks have higher expected returns. If advanced trading methods help disseminate 
information about small firms, possibly through available electronic order books, then 
this may increase both the breadth and depth of investor cognizance about small stocks. 
In turn, this would result in smaller size premiums. If small stocks have benefitted more 
from trade automation than larger stocks, then we are interested in whether the liquidity 
of a stock has become less dependent on its size subsequent to automation. Therefore, the 
change in relationship between liquidity and size is investigated by this hypothesis. 
  




                                                                          
Figure 2 plots monthly average Pearson correlation values between SIZE and both 
QSPD and ECOR. The figure clearly shows that the correlation is generally decreasing 
during and subsequent to Hybrid, specifically for NYSE stocks. In order to formally test 
Hypothesis 3, we observe the coefficient of the SIZE interaction term (λEvent*SIZE) from 
Equation 1, which can be interpreted as the change in the contribution of the firms size to 
the liquidity of their stocks from the pre-Hybrid level, represented by the SIZE coefficient 
(δSIZE). Panel A of Table 4 presents results for SIZE deciles for the CRSP sample. Most of 
the interaction coefficients lack statistical significance. However, coefficients for decile 1 
are associated with significant positive values for quoted spreads, amortized spreads, and 
zeros measures, which counters the negative relationship between size and liquidity, 
indicating that these very small stocks are less penalized by illiquidity in the subsequent 
period. Results are also in the same directions for stocks in decile(s) 2 (3 and 5) for the 
zeros (quoted spreads) measures. A number of significant negative values are scattered 
across deciles 2 to 10. Results for the NYSE sub-sample (Panel B) shows that   
  can be 
rejected for decile 1 stocks when amortized spreads measures are used only. The 
hypothesis can also be rejected for medium size stocks (deciles 4 to 8) using other 




7. ASSET PRICING IMPLICATIONS: HYPOTHESIS AND 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The evidence from the previous section indicates a changing relation between size 
and liquidity. This is interpreted as indirect evidence that trade automation has succeeded, 
to some extent, in disentangling the liquidity and size attributes of stocks. We further 
extend the investigation to examine the impact from an asset pricing perspective by 
assessing any effect automation could have on the different parameters that the asset 
pricing literature finds relevant in explaining stock returns. To put this in a more precise 
way; if automation has “purified” the size effect, does the size effect continue to have the 
same impact on stock pricing? Or it has lost a portion of its effect that corresponds to the 
dislinked liquidity component? The hypothesis is as follows: 
  
                                                                      
                  
  
                                                                  
               
If market changes succeed in decreasing the relationship between liquidity and 
size effects, then the latter as represented by the SMB factor is expected to have less 
explanatory power for returns. This assumes that the size effect captures part of the 
liquidity premium. To test this conjecture, the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) is 
employed, augmented by LIQFAC and LIQLEV in order to examine factor and level 
effects of liquidity. According to He and Kryzanowski (2006) and Luo and Sadka (2011), 
liquidity has two channels through which it affects equity returns; level effect and 
33 
 
sensitivity effect. On a priori basis, the level effect is expected to be more relevant for 
this test, since it directly captures changes in the infrastructure costs of trading 
attributable to automation events. Nevertheless, it is important to account for the 
sensitivity component. Hence, both measures are included in the model. The model also 
includes six Dummy Interaction terms, which are the interaction of Event with each of 
the independent variables. The used model has the following form: 
                                                           
                  ∑   
 
   
                 
    
                
 Equation 2 is estimated for the CRSP sample as well as the NYSE and NASDAQ 
sub-samples. In addition, the equation is estimated for each SIZE decile individually in 
each of the three samples. Coefficients are estimated using the generalized least squares 
method where standard errors are adjusted for time- and firm-level clustering as 
suggested by Peterson (2009). The coefficients of SIZEi,t, LIQFACt, and LIQLEVi,t are 
compared across deciles. As mentioned above, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) have 
observed that small stocks tend to have the highest loadings on the liquidity factor. We 
examine whether this phenomenon continues to be the same post-event or not. For the 
sake of robustness, this test is conducted a number of times using different horizons 
around events, as any impact on pricing explanatory factors might require long periods of 
time to materialize.    
 Panel A of Table 5 presents results for estimating Equation 2 for the CRSP 
sample. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, SMB interaction terms across all liquidity 
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measures are associated with significant negative loadings, indicating that the SMB factor 
lost part of its explanatory power. This allows us to reject   
  with 99% confidence level. 
Results for the NYSE sub-sample (Panel B) show that changes in the SMB factor 
loadings remain negative but they lose their statistical significance. NASDAQ sub-
sample results (Panel C) are also insignificant but mixed on signals. Results are similar 
when the window is reduced to two years, which indicates that the results for the four-
year window are not materially affected by the credit crisis in 2008. When the window is 
increased to six years, the NYSE sub-sample results show reductions in the SMB factor 
loadings that are significant at the 10% level, whereas changes remain insignificant for 
the NASDAQ sub-sample. Extended results for individual SIZE deciles of the CRSP 
sample are presented in Panel A of Table 6. The reduction in the SMB factor power is 
isolated in the smallest 2 and largest 3 deciles, with the most pronounced reduction for 
smallest stocks in decile 1. Findings are similar for the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-
samples, whose results are presented in Panels B and C, respectively. 
To extend the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) analysis about the association of 
small size stocks with high loadings on the liquidity factor, we observe changes in 
liquidity factor loadings in Equation 2. Aggregate sample results in Table 5 show that the 
LIQFAC interaction terms are associated with significant positive values, indicating that 
liquidity risk exposure has generally increased after Hybrid. The increase is even more 
pronounced for the NYSE sub-sample. NASDAQ sub-sample results, however, show that 
liquidity risk has in fact decreased. In untabulated results, changes in LIQFAC coefficients 
show that increases are more concentrated in smaller stocks in NYSE, whereas the 




The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of trade automation and other 
recent changes in financial market design on stock characteristics. The study also 
investigates whether trade automation has offered similar advantages to stocks regardless 
of their size, a factor that seems to be overlooked by most of studies that have examined 
the effect of trade automation. The conjecture tested is that small-size stocks have 
benefited the most and that liquidity improvement is a negative function of size. This 
result implies that liquidity is becoming less dependent on size and that technology, along 
with other changes in market design, are disentangling these two factors that used to be 
more closely related in a traditional market setup. This paper has asset pricing 
implications as automation has a differential impact on liquidity for firms of different 
sizes. 
The impact of trade automation on stocks listed on NYSE is tested by examining 
the impact of the implementation of the Hybrid system on various liquidity aspects. 
Orders containing up to one million shares can be executed electronically through 
Hybrid. The system has been gradually activated between October 2006 and January 
2007. Tests have also been applied to NASDAQ stocks as a control group for robustness 
purposes. The relatively short implementation period of Hybrid and the use of control 
variables in the test specifications reduce the probability that exogenous factors 
contributed to the observed effect. This possibility however is not eliminated, and 
findings are attributed to automation based on the assumption that no other factor has a 
significant contribution to changes.    
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Findings can be summarized as follows. Liquidity has generally improved after 
the implementation of the Hybrid, and this improvement is more pronounced for smaller 
stocks for some liquidity measures only. The relation between size and liquidity changed 
post-Hybrid, especially for NYSE stocks. The size effect in asset pricing significantly 
decreased post-Hybrid for the CRSP sample, but we do not find evidence on that when 
the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples are tested individually. Also, there is evidence that 
NYSE small stocks are recently becoming more prone to liquidity risk.     
 While the test involves a NYSE event, hypothesized phenomena are also present 
in NASDAQ to varying extents. Competitive spill-over effects can be one possible reason 
for that. Other markets, such as NASDAQ, might be forced by competition to react to 
such an event in a similar way to that of NYSE. But the magnitude of the similarity of 
results between NYSE and NASDAQ might point at other possible explanations. In 
addition, the findings are not consistent across all liquidity measures. Finally, despite the 
use of multiple controls, we are not completely certain that the observed changes are a 
direct result of Hybrid, and not a consequence of some other factor(s).  
The study could be further improved by using transaction-level data. This would 
allow for the development of finer liquidity measures and for the decomposition of 
spreads into their basic components. This can help, for instance, to exclude the 
information asymmetry component of spreads, which is thought to be adversely reacting 
to automation (Hendershott and Moulton, 2011). Transaction-level data would also allow 
focusing on specific transactions that are more affected by changes than others. For 
example, the Direct+ system processes small orders of less than 1,099 shares. One can 
examine transactions involving only such orders. Also, examining ECN transactions 
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could also add further insight into this investigation. Finally, obtaining access to the 
transaction history of a brokerage house can possibly reveal actual behavior of brokers 
towards small stocks after such automation events. Nevertheless, we argue that this study 
has an important contribution to the literature. Studies in this area tend to assume that 
changes in market design are like a rising tide that lifts all boats. This study identifies an 
important issue that needs to be considered; namely, stocks are affected differently by 
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 Table 1: Univariate analysis for changes in spreads 
Univariate analysis for changes in both quoted spreads (QSPD) and effective spreads based on Corwin and Schultz (2011) estimation method (ECOR), 
after the implementation of the Hybrid system on the NYSE, for the entire CRSP sample as well as NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples. Statistics are also 
presented for each size decile individually for NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples, where decile 1 (10) contains smallest (largest) stocks. Stocks are assigned to 
their size deciles based on their pre-Hybrid average size decile. The first four columns contain average QSPD and ECOR both before and after Hybrid. In the 
next four columns, percentage change in spreads are presented, defined as the average spread of the post-Hybrid year minus the average spread of the pre-Hybrid 
year, divided by the pre-Hybrid average, and multiplied by 100 to obtain percentages. Observations during the Hybrid roll-out period (October 2006 to January 






 which denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
   
Market 
Average proportional spreads in percentages   Percentage change in spreads 
QSPD ECOR   QSPD ECOR 
Pre-Hybrid Post-Hybrid Pre-Hybrid Post-Hybrid   Mean Median Mean Median 





























































































































Average proportional spreads in percentages   Percentage change in spreads 
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Table 2: Percentage of small stocks across quoted spread deciles 
Percentage of small stocks across quoted spread (QSPD) deciles. Stocks have been sorted into QSPD deciles on a daily basis, where decile 1 (10) 
corresponds to the smallest (widest) spread stocks. The percentage of smallest 30% stocks in each decile has been calculated for the year preceding Hybrid (Pre-
event: October 2005 to September 2006) and the year subsequent to it (Post-event: February 2007 to January 2008), separately. The analysis has been made for 
the CRSP sample as well as NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples. 
 
 





CRSP sample  NYSE sub-sample  NASDAQ sub-sample 
Pre-Hybrid Post-Hybrid  Pre-Hybrid Post-Hybrid  Pre-Hybrid Post-Hybrid 
1  2.20% 3.62%  0.90% 2.00%  3.51% 3.00% 
2  2.70% 7.25%  1.50% 4.55%  2.45% 5.17% 
3  7.98% 10.83%  5.01% 6.70%  6.91% 8.26% 
4  11.52% 14.41%  7.21% 8.79%  10.80% 10.90% 
5  17.97% 17.94%  12.47% 11.67%  16.00% 13.84% 
6  22.71% 21.54%  16.51% 15.69%  19.94% 16.98% 
7  30.57% 29.39%  23.84% 22.72%  30.00% 26.15% 
8  47.06% 45.41%  36.30% 34.84%  50.44% 45.87% 
9  69.62% 65.88%  54.21% 47.20%  74.19% 70.60% 
10  87.63% 83.70%  61.42% 47.64%  93.03% 90.06% 
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Table 3: Estimation of equation 1 
Results for estimating Equation 1: 
                                                                         
                                                                                               
  ∑   
 
   
                           
Where LIQi,t refers to one of the seven liquidity measures used, for each stock i at day t: quoted spreads (QSPD), effective spreads based on both Corwin and 
Schultz (2011) estimation method (ECOR) and the Gibbs estimator (EGIB) of Hasbrouck (2009), amortized spreads (ACOR and AGIB) based on the two 
estimations of effective spreads, Amihud’s price impact measure (Amihud), and the Zeros measure (Zeros) of Lesmond et al. (1999). Each of these liquidity 
measures are regressed on Event; a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) after (before) the implementation of Hybrid, and a set of nine control variables. 
Control variables are: daily closing volatility index value VIX; RETYesterday, RETToday, and RETTomorrow which refer to equally-weighted average market 
returns at days t-1, t, and t+1, respectively; natural log of market capitalization value (SIZE); closing price (PRC); turnover (TO); and daily differences of closing 
price and turnover (PRCDIF and TODIF, respectively). In addition, interaction terms of Event with each of the controls are also included in the specification 
(Dummy Interaction). Hybrid was phased-in gradually between October 6, 2006 and January 24, 2007. Observations pertaining to this period are excluded. 
Observations used are of the year preceding Hybrid (October 2005 to September 2006) and the year subsequent to its implementation (February 2007 to January 






 which denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A presents results for the CRSP sample, whereas Panels B and C present results for 
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Table 4: Estimation of equation 1 for size deciles  
Results for estimating Equation 1: 
                                                                         
                                                                                               
  ∑   
 
   
                           
Where LIQi,t refers to one of the seven liquidity measures used, for each stock i at day t: quoted spreads (QSPD), effective spreads based on both Corwin and 
Schultz (2011) estimation method (ECOR) and the Gibbs estimator (EGIB) of Hasbrouck (2009), amortized spreads (ACOR and AGIB) based on the two 
estimations of effective spreads, Amihud’s price impact measure (Amihud), and the Zeros measure (Zeros) of Lesmond et al. (1999). Each of these liquidity 
measures are regressed on Event; a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) after (before) the implementation of Hybrid, and a set of nine control variables. 
Control variables are: daily closing volatility index value VIX; RETYesterday, RETToday, and RETTomorrow which refer to equally-weighted average market 
returns at days t-1, t, and t+1, respectively; natural log of market capitalization value (SIZE); closing price (PRC); turnover (TO); and daily differences of closing 
price and turnover (PRCDIF and TODIF, respectively). In addition, interaction terms of Event with each of the controls are also included in the specification 
(Dummy Interaction). Hybrid was phased-in gradually between October 6, 2006 and January 24, 2007. Observations pertaining to this period are excluded. 
Observations used are of the year preceding Hybrid (October, 2005 to September, 2006) and the year subsequent to its implementation (February 2007 to January 






 which denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A presents results for the CRSP sample, whereas Panels B and C present results for 
NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples, respectively. Presented results include estimates of Event, SIZE, and Event*SIZE variables only. The equation has been 
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10 
        
β 0.044938 0.0189892 -9.34E+10*** -0.0027734 0.0005054 0.0002804 -0.0107459 
δSIZE -0.0016465*** -0.0010847** 310763972 -0.0000936 -0.0001787* -0.0000973*** -0.0014693* 
 Event*SIZE -0.0033154* -0.0012361 4244722258*** -0.0000344 -0.000053 -0.0000196*** 0.0001811 




Table 5: Estimation of equation 2 using a four-year window 
Results for estimating Equation 2: 
                                                                             
 ∑   
 
   
                 
    
      
 
Where RETi,t is the daily return of stock i at day t, MKT is daily market excess return, SMB and HML are Fama and French daily small-minus-big and high-
minus-low daily factors, respectively, UMD is the daily momentum factor, LIQFAC is a daily liquidity factor, and LIQLEV is a daily level liquidity measure 
which is calculated for each stock i, based on one of the seven liquidity measures (LIQ) at a time. The construction method of LIQFAC and LIQLEV is presented 
in the data and measures section. Liquidity measures are: quoted spreads (QSPD), effective spreads based on both Corwin and Schultz (2011) estimation method 
(ECOR) and the Gibbs estimator (EGIB) of Hasbrouck (2009), amortized spreads (ACOR and AGIB) based on the two estimations of effective spreads, Amihud’s 
price impact measure (Amihud), and the Zeros measure (Zeros) of Lesmond et al. (1999). RET is regressed on these factors in addition to Dummy Interaction 
variables, which are interaction terms of Event (a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) after (before) the implementation of Hybrid) with each of the 
abovementioned independent variables. Hybrid was phased-in gradually between October 6, 2006 and January 24, 2007. Observations pertaining to this period 
are excluded. Observations used are of the two years preceding Hybrid (October 2004 to September 2006) and the two years subsequent to its implementation 
(February 2007 to January 2009). Coefficients are estimated using generalized least squares method with adjustment for time and firm effects. Significance levels 






 which denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A presents results for the CRSP sample, whereas Panels B 
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βMKT  0.8791297*** 0.8763484*** 0.8846212*** 0.8773019*** 0.8791014*** 0.897416*** 0.8767845*** 
 Event*MKT  0.2496932*** 0.2517075*** 0.2465027*** 0.2507076*** 0.2509643*** 0.2377306*** 0.251183*** 
βSMB  0.3634335*** 0.3626953*** 0.3660888*** 0.3629279*** 0.3645465*** 0.3734663*** 0.3627851*** 
 Event*SMB  -0.033658 -0.03316 -0.0319752 -0.0332347 -0.0309426 -0.0384306 -0.033137 
βHML  0.2492915*** 0.2469734*** 0.2521919*** 0.2480677*** 0.2465523*** 0.2561909*** 0.2472694*** 
 Event*HML  -0.281701*** -0.279424*** -0.285995*** -0.2808461*** -0.2797838*** -0.2894421*** -0.279992*** 
βUMD  0.0457556*** 0.0465551*** 0.0395274*** 0.0461925*** 0.0413408*** 0.0450664*** 0.0464878*** 
 Event*UMD  -0.135347*** -0.136262*** -0.1302328*** -0.1359902*** -0.1318109*** -0.1359026*** -0.136261*** 
βLIQLEV  0.0235707 0.0014117 0.2269291*** 0.0045208*** 0.0477616*** 0*** -0.002776*** 
 Event*LIQLEV  -0.03423*** 0.0204688** -0.2613395*** -0.0043583*** -0.0504252*** 0*** 0.0006496 
βLIQFAC  0.0898718*** 0.0870614*** 0.0962829*** 0.0878753*** 0.0908741*** 0.0896228*** 0.0875336*** 


























βMKT  0.9560281*** 0.9568354*** 0.9553647*** 0.9553146*** 0.9572688*** 0.9869895*** 0.9573295*** 
 Event*MKT  0.03266*** 0.0317692*** 0.0342366*** 0.0318249*** 0.0325427*** 0.017988*** 0.0315785*** 
βSMB  0.7074071*** 0.7078443*** 0.7090299*** 0.707166*** 0.7095473*** 7.30E-01*** 0.7077354*** 
 Event*SMB  -0.00019 -0.000199 0.0005369 0.0001361 0.0001801 -0.0076973 -0.000392 
βHML  -0.087246*** -0.087265*** -0.0893963*** -0.0884916*** -0.0876418*** -8.77E-02*** -0.086492*** 
 Event*HML  0.1019646*** 0.1027108*** 0.1040965*** 0.1027468*** 0.1020504*** 0.1023318*** 0.1011425*** 
βUMD  -0.034892*** -0.035188*** -0.0375334*** -0.0344882*** -0.0380851*** -3.78E-02*** -0.035125*** 
 Event*UMD  -0.031741* -0.030685* -0.0291773* -0.0322841* -0.0288931* -3.06E-02 -0.031557* 
βLIQLEV  0.0226468*** 0.0690759*** 0.0866824*** 0.007834*** 0.0158051*** 0*** -0.001575** 
 Event*LIQLEV  -0.023616*** -0.00466 -0.0728619*** -0.0044112 -0.0061527 0*** 0.0002918 
βLIQFAC  0.2855193*** 0.2866497*** 0.2839232*** 0.2850943*** 0.2858075*** 0.2967481*** 0.286917*** 




Table 6: Estimation of equation 2 for size deciles using a four-year window 
Results for estimating Equation 2:
 
                                                                             
 ∑   
 
   
                 
    
      
Where RETi,t is the daily return i at day t, MKT is daily market excess return, SMB and HML are Fama and French daily small-minus-big and high-minus-low 
daily factors, respectively, UMD is the daily momentum factor, LIQFAC is a daily liquidity factor, and LIQLEV is a daily level liquidity measure which is 
calculated for each stock i, based on one of the seven liquidity measures (LIQ) at a time. The construction method of LIQFAC and LIQLEV is presented in the 
data and measures section. Liquidity measures are: quoted spreads (QSPD), effective spreads based on both Corwin and Schultz (2011) estimation method 
(ECOR) and the Gibbs estimator (EGIB) of Hasbrouck (2009), amortized spreads (ACOR and AGIB)  based on the two estimations of effective spreads, 
Amihud’s price impact measure (Amihud), and the Zeros measure (Zeros) of Lesmond et al. (1999). RET is regressed on these factors in addition to Dummy 
Interaction variables, which are interaction terms of Event (a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) after (before) the implementation of Hybrid) with each 
of the abovementioned independent variables. Hybrid was phased-in gradually between October 6, 2006 and January 24, 2007. Observations pertaining to this 
period are excluded. Observations used are of the two years preceding Hybrid (October, 2004 to September, 2006) and the two years subsequent to its 
implementation (February 2007 to January 2009). Coefficients are estimated using generalized least squares method with adjustment for time and firm effects. 






 which denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A presents results for the CRSP 
sample, whereas Panels B and C present results for NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples, respectively. Presented results include estimates of Event, SIZE, and 










ACOR AGIB Amihud ECOR EGIB QSPD Zeros 
         
1 
        
βSMB 0.2892015*** 0.2882317*** 0.309*** 0.2882846*** 0.2851286*** 0.2868046*** 0.2902633*** 
 Event*SMB -0.2010214*** -0.2142084*** -0.2148645*** -0.200218*** -0.2123787*** -0.2011679*** -0.202453*** 
βLIQLEV 0.0119168*** 0.020511*** 0*** 0.1963945*** 0.104792*** 0.02357*** -0.0018773* 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0104149*** -0.0101763** 0*** -0.122993*** -0.1406466*** -0.0408349*** -0.0018155 
        
2 
        
βSMB 0.2995685*** 0.3033719*** 0.3182842*** 0.2981825*** 0.3038917*** 0.2999225*** 0.2999559*** 
 Event*SMB -0.083432* -0.0827688* -0.091079** -0.083368* -0.0830759* -0.0819462* -0.0835167* 
βLIQLEV 0.0053341 0.0158066 0*** 0.0876957*** 0.1112308*** 0.035448*** -0.0029455*** 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0049188 -0.0149782*** 0*** -0.016498 0.0020927 -0.0001556 0.0043338* 
        
3 
        
βSMB 0.4229367*** 0.4233116*** 0.4428092*** 0.4224226*** 0.4234388*** 0.4230839*** 0.4232679*** 
 Event*SMB 0.0743377 0.0949919 0.0682514 0.0756191 0.0948984 0.0745021 0.0740173 
βLIQLEV 0.0010443* 0.0063092 0*** 0.0706722*** 0.1965895*** 0.0302668*** 0.0001141 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0014349** -0.0058023 0*** -0.016316 -0.0688571 0.0099112 0.0040794 
        
4 
        
βSMB 0.7315754*** 0.7325155*** 0.7531405*** 0.7310769*** 0.731972*** 0.7321545*** 0.7316897*** 
 Event*SMB -0.001329 0.0232967 -0.0108273 -0.000434 0.0235441 -0.0010856 -0.0015126 
βLIQLEV 0.0008741 0.0269335** 0*** 0.1006073*** 0.2653498*** 0.0146261** -0.0007173 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0007522 -0.0288032** 0*** -0.048783** -0.0579726 0.03439*** 0.0039295** 
        
5 
        
βSMB 0.7832038*** 0.7880075*** 0.8046748*** 0.7839047*** 0.7875837*** 0.7827745*** 0.7830675*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0407484 -0.0247717 -0.0490022 -0.040748 -0.0243963 -0.0399976 -0.040477 
βLIQLEV 0.0015124 0.0093001 0*** 0.0140965** 0.2600354*** 0.0601645*** -0.001688*** 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0000305 -0.0041701 0*** 0.0425452*** -0.0793908 -0.01384 0.0053063** 
        
         








ACOR AGIB Amihud ECOR EGIB QSPD Zeros 
6 
        
βSMB 0.7797138*** 0.7863484*** 0.7973809*** 0.7801438*** 0.7865048*** 0.7808288*** 0.7795617*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0401362 -0.0339153 -0.0502918 -0.04024 -0.0339712 -0.0408164 -0.0399929 
βLIQLEV 0.0014467 0.0126256 0*** 0.0217016*** 0.4329578*** 0.0883051*** -0.0019924 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0011003 -0.0142347*** 0*** 0.0307588*** -0.245208*** -0.0706075*** 0.0036244** 
        
7 
        
βSMB 0.737074*** 0.7417886*** 0.7505705*** 0.7373053*** 0.7368926*** 0.7380703*** 0.7427521*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0671353** -0.0463718 -0.0745451** -0.066664** -0.067066** -0.0678193** -0.0468061 
βLIQLEV 0.0003623 0.011348* 0*** 0.0203382*** -0.0024693*** 0.032879*** 0.383555*** 
 Event*LIQLEV 0.0001877 -0.0067991 0*** 0.0217958** 0.001043 -0.0466258** -0.238855** 
        
8 
        
βSMB 0.589321*** 0.5884495*** 0.5990898*** 0.589339*** 0.5908007*** 0.5914444*** 0.5889262*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0863397*** -0.0779793*** -0.0927856*** -0.08627*** -0.0794905*** -0.0877924*** -0.08615*** 
βLIQLEV 0.0026013** 0.008009** 0*** 0.0223706* 0.3960267*** 0.0687466*** -0.0012485 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0012984 -0.0043883 0*** 0.0190592 -0.2995951** -0.0871604*** 0.0012467 
        
9 
        
βSMB 0.3159609*** 0.3175488*** 3.21E-01*** 0.31575*** 0.3199649*** 0.3189253*** 0.3163153*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0842498*** -0.0871991*** -8.64E-02*** -0.084107*** -0.0887036*** -0.0857253*** -0.0841748*** 
βLIQLEV 0.0017871*** 0.0052228 0*** 0.0115854 0.3231085*** 0.0659607* 0.0003366 
 Event*LIQLEV 0.0017136 0.0082778 0*** 0.013065 -0.2677402*** -0.0991388*** -0.0042661** 
        
10 
        
βSMB 0.0452306*** 0.046053*** 0.0467*** 0.0448974*** 0.049101*** 0.0477866*** 0.0456358*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0770921*** -0.0757803*** -0.0775*** -0.077028*** -0.0778973*** -0.0787339*** -0.0773466*** 
βLIQLEV -0.0033239 0.048429*** 0*** -0.029255* 0.2941178*** 0.0637129** -0.0000661 
 Event*LIQLEV 0.0040207 -0.0486289*** 0*** 0.0415413** -0.3005159*** -0.0776408** -0.0025417* 











ACOR AGIB Amihud ECOR EGIB QSPD Zeros 
         
1 
        
βSMB 0.170818*** 0.1807598*** 0.1796096*** 0.1695413*** 0.180352*** 0.1701116*** 0.170187*** 
 Event*SMB -0.20937*** -0.2142493*** -0.2134136*** -0.2073013*** -0.21359*** -0.2087304*** -0.20887*** 
βLIQLEV 0.00812 0.0078005 0*** 0.0384288 0.03607 0.006559 -0.00131 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.00893 -0.039731*** 0*** 0.0132169 -0.12497 0.0025725 -0.000064 
        
2 
        
βSMB 0.160411*** 0.1600239*** 0.1707966*** 0.1600368*** 0.160095*** 0.1599151*** 0.16016*** 
 Event*SMB -0.08372 -0.0865064 -0.0869945 -0.0838614 -0.08676 -0.0841929 -0.08385 
βLIQLEV 0.020347* 0.0272454 0*** 0.0033556 0.035473 -0.0051872 -0.00252** 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.01853* -0.0420612 0*** -0.0053446 -0.1603* -0.0135479 0.003641 
        
3 
        
βSMB 0.233047*** 0.2348895*** 0.245761*** 0.2326153*** 0.235344*** 0.2334009*** 0.234198*** 
 Event*SMB 0.066025 0.0691445 0.063229 0.0662823 0.068442 0.066775 0.06524 
βLIQLEV -0.00106 0.0402075 0*** -0.0358031** 0.095455 0.0191528** -0.00166 
 Event*LIQLEV 0.003878 -0.0534442 0*** 0.0583269*** -0.26344** 0.0255256 0.004709 
        
4 
        
βSMB 0.44163*** 0.443944*** 0.4608989*** 0.4410635*** 0.444933*** 0.4411293*** 0.441527*** 
 Event*SMB 0.008691 0.0155099 -0.0003344 0.0091951 0.014752 0.0090085 0.008595 
βLIQLEV 0.009236 0.0585367* 0*** 0.0102712 0.217378*** 0.0679414*** -0.00286** 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.01087 -0.0622933** 0*** 0.0136329 -0.28416** -0.066513*** 0.003851* 
        
5 
        
βSMB 0.464323*** 0.4678607*** 0.4828717*** 0.4642448*** 0.46814*** 0.4622162*** 0.464367*** 
 Event*SMB 0.107946*** 0.1130574*** 0.1027788*** 0.1078689*** 0.112908*** 0.1108219*** 0.107847*** 
βLIQLEV 0.006539 0.0754503** 0*** 0.0035528 0.244737** 0.0697462*** -0.00179* 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.00468 -0.0842838*** 0*** 0.0388035** -0.26645** 0.0466597 0.004295 
        








ACOR AGIB Amihud ECOR EGIB QSPD Zeros 
         
6 
        
βSMB 0.644968*** 0.6494919*** 0.6649994*** 0.6448789*** 0.650607*** 0.6458978*** 0.644941*** 
 Event*SMB -0.00476 -0.004065 -0.0170469 -0.0038859 -0.00484 -0.0053492 -0.00478 
βLIQLEV 0.001178 0.055401** 0*** -0.0137987 0.323368*** 0.0652247*** -0.00159** 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.001 -0.0657019** 0*** 0.06185*** -0.27492*** -0.0684193** 0.002614*** 
        
7 
        
βSMB 0.657737*** 0.6574928*** 0.6712252*** 0.6579661*** 0.659244*** 0.6590381*** 0.657968*** 
 Event*SMB -0.03787 -0.0281823 -0.0445913 -0.0376164 -0.02932 -0.039022 -0.03817 
βLIQLEV 0.008471*** 0.0449235** 0*** 0.0161832*** 0.299369*** 0.022919*** -0.00262*** 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0075*** -0.0412362** 0*** 0.0147416*** -0.27714*** -0.0547134*** -0.0017 
        
8 
        
βSMB 0.533206*** 0.5286986*** 0.5439424*** 0.5333495*** 0.530689*** 0.5357233*** 0.533179*** 
 Event*SMB -0.04864** -0.0475754** -0.0559631*** -0.0490043*** -0.0488** -0.0504021*** -0.04868** 
βLIQLEV 0.001396 0.0370917* 0*** 0.0137626 0.335559*** 0.0544276** -0.00144 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.00185 -0.0346395* 0*** 0.0117132 -0.26317** -0.094427*** -0.00054 
        
9 
        
βSMB 0.298208*** 0.3013276*** 0.3038032*** 0.2982295*** 0.303607*** 0.3010808*** 0.298617*** 
 Event*SMB -0.08601*** -0.0907029*** -0.0896182*** -0.0861457*** -0.09215*** -0.0877663*** -0.08636*** 
βLIQLEV 0.005038*** 0.0331165* 0*** 0.0060907 0.288025*** 0.0601332 0.000552 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.00516*** -0.0256904 0*** -0.0016209 -0.25796** -0.0949269*** -0.00375** 
        
10 
        
βSMB 0.03179** 0.0332291** 0.0340749** 0.0315449** 0.035657*** 0.0343236*** 0.032049** 
 Event*SMB -0.08706*** -0.0867237*** -0.0879*** -0.0870958*** -0.08844*** -0.0886776*** -0.08725*** 
βLIQLEV -0.00271 0.0603419*** 0*** -0.0215342 0.280513*** 0.0685968** -0.0002 
 Event*LIQLEV 0.002271 -0.0657832*** 0*** 0.0307446* -0.29446** -0.0819683** -0.00193 











ACOR AGIB Amihud ECOR EGIB QSPD Zeros 
         
1 
        
βSMB 0.3741632*** 0.367035*** 0.4029933*** 0.372303*** 0.362082*** 0.3718824*** 0.376894*** 
 Event*SMB -0.2164937*** -0.21381*** -0.2326511*** -0.21514*** -0.21107*** -0.2176689*** -0.21973*** 
βLIQLEV 0.0120933*** 0.020147*** 0*** 0.218202*** 0.099598*** 0.0220248** -0.00245 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0088234*** 0.002583 0*** -0.12512*** -0.13443*** -0.039652*** -0.0022* 
        
2 
        
βSMB 0.3854685*** 0.395838*** 0.4102942*** 0.38499*** 0.397761*** 0.3875048*** 0.38657*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0089343 -0.01642 -0.015615 -0.01072 -0.01722 -0.0074214 -0.00907 
βLIQLEV 0.0053959 0.012566*** 0*** 0.094155*** 0.101449*** 0.0382122*** -0.00248** 
 Event*LIQLEV 0.0000464 -0.00793 0*** -0.0048 0.038633 0.0023056 0.004252 
        
3 
        
βSMB 0.5556519*** 0.558148*** 0.58021*** 0.557743*** 0.55975*** 0.5561305*** 0.556735*** 
 Event*SMB 0.2276809 0.225677 0.2251788 0.226858 0.224618 0.2276291 0.226483 
βLIQLEV 0.0020923** 0.003814 0*** 0.041941*** 0.24381*** 0.0854701*** 0.003086*** 
 Event*LIQLEV 0.0055548 0.012905 0*** 0.011995 0.040151 -0.0239146 0.002406 
        
4 
        
βSMB 0.9697009*** 0.966115*** 0.989878*** 0.971527*** 0.966351*** 0.9689446*** 0.969296*** 
 Event*SMB 0.106707*** 0.114348*** 0.0995682*** 0.107164*** 0.114615*** 0.1071876*** 0.107054*** 
βLIQLEV -0.0009939 0.017907 0*** 0.0035320 0.275214*** 0.1170646*** 0.004171*** 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0008245 -0.01541 0*** 0.055582*** 0.17743*** -0.0537921 0.002454 
        
5 
        
βSMB 1.0320893*** 1.036568*** 1.0522601*** 1.034223*** 1.035866*** 1.0325064*** 1.031839*** 
 Event*SMB -0.022228 -0.01959 -0.0319621 -0.02265 -0.01901 -0.0224917 -0.0221 
βLIQLEV 0.002264 0.008805 0*** 0.017463** 0.197285*** 0.0518723** 8.11E-05 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0009495 -0.01672 0*** 0.054045*** 0.20197*** -0.0425678 0.005702** 
        








ACOR AGIB Amihud ECOR EGIB QSPD Zeros 
         
6 
        
βSMB 0.9565385*** 0.959582*** 0.970484*** 0.95749*** 0.956924*** 0.9580816*** 0.956317*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0141698 -0.01568 -0.0216141 -0.01546 -0.01346 -0.0155231 -0.01396 
βLIQLEV -0.0000885 -0.0051 0*** 0.02695*** 0.446822*** 0.1224594** 0.000864 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0008105 -0.00056 0*** 0.030806*** -0.1224 -0.0871934 0.00284 
        
7 
        
βSMB 0.8945918*** 0.898499*** 0.9073942** 0.89505*** 0.896674*** 0.8960722*** 0.894085*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0516838* -0.05428** -0.0601599** -0.05134* -0.05227* -0.0531064** -0.05189* 
βLIQLEV -0.0018891 0.024802*** 0*** 0.017509 0.386019*** 0.0632335** -0.00017 
 Event*LIQLEV 0.0058102 -0.00141 0*** 0.037907** -0.06321 -0.0719931** 0.003039 
        
8 
        
βSMB 0.7590138*** 0.759733*** 0.767239*** 0.759593*** 0.761176*** 0.762289*** 0.759126*** 
 Event*SMB -0.095014*** -0.09639*** -0.0997482*** -0.09437*** -0.09731*** -0.097692*** -0.09595*** 
βLIQLEV 0.0059658*** 0.019446** 0*** 0.032162*** 0.472949*** 0.0904183* 0.000428 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0011312 -0.01493 0*** 0.034864 -0.28465* -0.1089046*** 0.000773 
        
9 
        
βSMB 0.4041514*** 0.400341*** 4.10E-01*** 0.404293*** 0.402826*** 0.4086288*** 0.405386*** 
 Event*SMB -0.0923612*** -0.08504*** -9.30E-02*** -0.0937*** -0.08642*** -0.0948298*** -0.09296*** 
βLIQLEV 0.0084916*** 0.028434*** 0*** 0.026032* 0.448333*** 0.0751305*** 0.000054 
 Event*LIQLEV -0.0018061 -0.02191 0*** 0.039698** -0.32057*** -0.1201487*** -0.00736*** 
        
10 
        
βSMB 0.1369826** 0.140014*** 0.140** 0.136155** 0.143529*** 0.1391352** 0.137946** 
 Event*SMB -0.0285135 -0.02904 -0.032 -0.02828 -0.03147 -0.0299763 -0.02942 
βLIQLEV -0.0072495* 0.042998*** 0*** -0.05529*** 0.382692*** 0.0885997* 0.000726 
 Event*LIQLEV 0.009378** -0.03964** 0*** 0.088546*** -0.34694** -0.0599562 -0.00588** 





Figure 1: Percentage of stocks with declining spreads 
Percentage of stocks witnessing a decline in quoted spreads / effective spreads according to 
Corwin and Schultz (2011) estimation method, after the implementation of the Hybrid, for NYSE-listed 
(Figure 1.A) and NASDAQ-listed (Figure 1.B) stocks. The analysis is made for each size decile 
individually as presented on the horizontal axis, where decile 1 (10) contains smallest (largest) stocks, 
respectively. Percentages of stocks with declining spreads are on the vertical axis.   
 
Figure 1.A - NYSE sub-sample 
 



























































Figure 2: Correlation between size and liquidity 
Monthly absolute Pearson correlation values between size, measured by the natural log of market 
capitalization values, and both quoted / effective spreads according to Corwin and Schultz (2011) 
estimation method, for the CRSP sample (A) as well as NYSE (B) and NASDAQ (C) sub-samples, for the 
period from October 2005 until January 2008 - the two-year period around the Hybrid implementation, 
including the four-month system roll-out period which is marked on graphs by rectangular boxes.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
